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I. THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY CLEAR, CONVINCING, 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE! 
The plaintiff and appellant rebuts only facts which are 
alleged to be relevant to the issues presented by the defendant 
and respondent in their brief, to-wit: 
CLAIM: a. It is claimed that Black was to pay to 
Israel Pagan $1,000.00 at the closing. 
FACT: This statement is true but it only tells part of the 
story. Dorius Black did execute a promissory note for One 
Thousand Dollars; but he never intended to pay anything; nor did 
he pay anything, in fact, Bill Brown Realty was given the 
$1,000.00 down payment after the closing out of the Pagan equity 
(TR-564). The $1,000.00 came from monies received from Capitol 
Thrift and was drawn on the account of Stewart Title (TR-564). 
Black personally paid nothing and he denied having any interest 
in or taking any title to the Pagan property, and further denied 
being liable for the making of any loans or the borrowing of any 
money on the Pagan property (TR-499). 
CLAIM: b. Based on value of the home and Mr. Cannon's 
financial strength, lender agreed to loan $32,325.00 to Cannon 
for the purpose of purchasing Pagan's property. 
FACT: Again, this claim is partially true. The loan was made 
on the value of the home; as far as Joseph Cannon's financial 
strength is concerned, it was always questionable; his testimony 
was questionable; and, he certainly became financially "insecure" 
shortly after the transaction was completed. (Tr-857) also (See 
Exhibit "1", Exhibit "7", Exhibit "37", and Exhibit "38D".) 
Cannon has no recollection of submitting a credit report prior to 
this transaction (TR-575). Cannon denied negotiating with Capitol 
Thrift about a loan on the Pagan property (TR-582). Cannon denies 
making any applications to Capitol Thrift for a loan on the Pagan 
property (TR-582, 583, 584). Cannon denies, under oath, giving 
Capitol Thrift the financial statement. (See Exhibit "36", 
TR-596). He further denied giving Capitol Thrift Borrower's 
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Statement. (See Exhibit "37", TR-596.) Joseph Cannon testified 
his only purpose for being at the closing was to be a guarantor 
of loans and purchases of Dorius Black (TR-566, 567, 569-570, 
582). Joseph Cannon never put one cent of his money in the real 
estate transaction. He made no payments on the trust deed and 
note and claimed no equity in the Pagan property. In fact, he 
admitted he had never seen the property and that he didn't even 
know that the property had been deeded to him (TR-570, 572, 578, 
584, 593-594). Cannon testified that he did not receive any money 
personally from the transaction (TR-566, 568). 
CLAIM: c. Mr. Cannon went to Capitol Thrift and 
extended his loan payments on two separate occasions when the 
loan became delinquent (TR-855). 
FACT: Cannon admitted going to Capitol Thrift but denied 
making any payments for the extensions (TR-856). Cannon was 
financially "insecure" six (6) months after the transaction 
(TR-857). The ledger card did not show who made the alleged 
payment (TR-645). Hanks testified that the records do not show 
where the money came from (TR-646). Neither Black nor Cannon made 
any payments on the Pagan home (TR-494, 496, 498, 503, 504, 506, 
and 523, 852). 
CLAIM: d. Capitol Thrift was not involved in any of 
the business arrangements between Black, Cannon or Alpha Leasing 
(TR-523, 524). 
FACT: Capitol Thrift appraised the home, prepared the note 
and mortgage, substituted Cannon for Black as buyer, paid Black 
$4,848.75, paid Cannon $13,471.57 and generally financed the 
entire transaction. Capitol Thrift supplied the Trust Deed and 
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Note; required that their Trust Deed be recorded first; ordered 
$4,848.75 to be paid to Capitol Thrift and the remainder of the 
funds to be paid to Joseph L. Cannon or so as he directs, that 
Cannon's name be put on all checks so as to prove consideration 
in this matter (TR-505, See also Plaintiffs Exhibit "1"), 
CLAIM: e. Business arrangement to purchase Pagan's 
home was between Cannon, Alpha Leasing and Black. 
FACT: Capitol Thrift financed the entire transaction, 
appraised Pagan's home, paid Black finder's fee, substituted 
Cannon for Black, prepared Exhibit "1", prepared note and 
mortgage, directed the order of recording, participated in the 
transaction from beginning to end with directions on how to 
disburse the funds. Cannon was not told by Capitol Thrift that he 
had been substituted as a buyer (TR-849). 
CLAIM: f. Loan officer Hanks did not even know who 
Mr. Pagan was at that time (TR-860). 
FACT: This is hard to believe when Merlyn Hanks personally 
appraised Pagan's home; financed entire transaction; prepared all 
documents; insisted that Israel Pagan deed his house and lot to 
Joseph Cannon and have the deed recorded first and prior to the 
second trust deed from Cannon to Pagan. (TR-505, 620. See 
plaintiff's Exhibit "1".) 
CLAIM: g. Evidence clearly showed Capitol Thrift's 
involvement was limited to Promissory Note and transaction of 
Cannon (TR-860). 
FACT: Capitol Thrift supervised all documents; supplied all 
monies by written instructions; set forth the terms of the entire 
transaction; gave instructions on disbursal of all funds, to-wit: 
4 
(a) $4,848,75 to Capitol Thrift and Loan; (b) fees for recording 
and title insurance policy; (c) remainder of funds to Joseph N. 
Cannon or as he directs, in the disbursement Capitol Thrift 
recommended that Joseph N. Cannon's name be on all checks so as 
to prove consideration in this matter. (See plaintiff's Exhibit 
"1", TR-505.) Subituted Cannon for Black as purchaser. 
CLAIM: h. The only money owed by Black to Capitol 
Thrift at the time of the transaction was $4,848.75. 
FACT: Capitol Thrift knew that Dorius Black was a skilled 
land developer and they knew that he was heavily in debt to them 
(TR-490, 524, 562, 608, 610). Black testified he owed Capitol 
Thrift money before the transaction and after the transaction 
(TR-497). Capitol Thrift knew that Black was not taking title nor 
was he making any any loans or borrowing any money; he was there 
for the sole purpose of assisting in dividing Israel Pagan's 
equity. (Tr-496). (Tr-503 ) 
CLAIM: i. Vickie Phelps participated in the closing 
(TR-667, 580). 
FACT: Vickie Phelps testified that while she was at the 
closing there was no mention of a Capitol Thrift mortgage. 
(Tr-750); nor, was there any mention of substituting Cannon for 
Black. (Tr-754). 
CLAIM: j - Sisk conducted the closing in a slow and 
careful manner; Pagan asked numerous questions through his 
interpreter when he did not understand the transaction (TR-693). 
FACT: Cannon testified that most of the time, at that time, 
was spent preparing documents by someone and when the documents 
were prepared, that was a very quick action (TR-580, 581). The 
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rest of the time was waiting for that to happen (TR-737-739). 
Vickie Phelps (TR-749, 750, 752), Emelio Ortiz, and Jack Thorpe, 
all testified that material facts were withheld; that there was a 
deviation from the Earnest Money Receipt and that the parties did 
not understand the transaction (TR-766, 718-720). 
CLAIM: k. Sisk testified he told Pagan that Cannon 
was purchasing the property and not Black (TR-671). 
FACT: Tommy Sisk, Stewart Title Company specialist, admitted 
to Emilio Ortiz "It was a crook from the beginning. I know that, 
but I'm not a lawyer to say anything." (TR-766) 
CLAIM: 1. Sisk told Pagan that the first and second 
trust deeds would exceed the $44,000.00 sales price and that the 
Capitol Trust Deed would be recorded ahead of Pagan's $24,000.00 
trust deed and that Pagan was told that if Cannon did not pay his 
first mortgage then Pagan would have to pay in order to protect 
his second mortgage, and that Pagan nor his real estate agent 
Rhodes objected to Pagan's trust deed being recorded second 
(TR-713). 
FACT: The foregoing conflicts with Real Estate Agent Jack 
Rhodes testimony. See (TR-718-720)• to-wit: 
Q. Was anything said in that closing about mortgages with 
Capitol Thrift and Loan. 
A. No sir, not to my recollection. 
Q. Was anything at the closing ever said about a First 
Mortgage to Capitol Thrift and Loan in the amount of $32,325.00. 
A. No. 
Q. I'm going to show you what has been marked Exhibit 19. 
Was that ever shown to you at the closing by Mr. Sisk or anyone 
else? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have any knowledge of any type or nature of a 
note, Exhibit 2, that that Trust Deed secured? 
A. No. I had no knowledge at all of any amount over and 
above the original offer, earnest money, which was a total of 
$44,000.00. These documents were not discussed while I was 
present. 
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CLAIM: nw Pagan testified he did not claim cause of 
action against Capitol Thrift (TR-467). 
FACT: Dr. William Barrett testified that Israel Pagan was in 
the low to normal range between 80 and 90. Pagan was mentally 
deficient (TR-541, 743, 744, 745). 
CLAIM: n. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, provides 
that the court may reverse a jury verdict. 
FACT: "A party claiming that the evidence does not support 
the jury's verdict carries a heavy burden. The evidence is 
considered in the light most supportive of the verdict, Berkeley 
Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, Utah, 607 P.2d 798 (1980), and 
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury where 
the verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Schwartz v. Tanner, Utah, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (1978)." 
CLAIM: o. Miner says Mr. Black was employed by 
Capitol Thrift. Respondent's brief at page 20. 
FACT: It has never been claimed that Dorius Black was an 
employee of Capitol Thrift. It has always been claimed that 
Dorius Black was a finder who was paid $4,848.75 by Capitol 
Thrift who was well acquainted with Dorius Black (TR-493, 497, 
498). Capitol Thrift knew that Dorius Black did not have a real 
estate license and, whose only interests was financial gain at 
Pagan's expense (TR-197, 490, 492, 579). 
CLAIM: p. Plaintiff's own expert testified that a lay 
person would not be able to tell Mr. Pagan was disabled by 
looking at him. 
FACT: Israel Pagan had a badly scarred face; an IQ between 
80 and 90 (TR-540, 550-551); he had never been to school; he 
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spoke very broken English; he had little or no abstract thinking 
ability (TR-538); his mentality was such that he did not 
comprehend or understand the real estate transaction (TR-541, 
743, 744, and 745). 
CLAIM: q. Plaintiff's own real estate agents 
testified that they felt Pagan was capable of entering into the 
real estate transaction. 
FACT: Plaintiff's real estate agents both testified that 
there was a substantial deviation from original earnest money 
receipt (TR-718-720): 
1. Trust deed from Cannon to Capitol Thrift was 
concealed. 
2. Note from Cannon to Capitol Thrift was concealed. 
3. $34,000.00 Trust deed at 22% interest to be paid 
in six (6) months was concealed. 
4. The placing of $55,000.00 worth of mortgages on 
the property was concealed. 
5. Rhodes testified that there was a substantial 
deviation from the agreed Earnest Money Receipt and the final 
transaction (TR-737-739); that Rhodes never understood the 
transaction; that it is in his opinion that Pagan never 
understood the transaction (TR-737-739). Vickie Phelps testified 
that the Capitol Thrift mortgage between Cannon and Capitol 
Thrift was never discussed (TR-752). 
CLAIM: r. All deviations to the contract were slowly 
and clearly explained to Pagan through his interpreter. 
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FACT: Cannon testified that: "Most of the time was spent in 
the preparation of documents by someone and when the documents 
were prepared, that was a very quick action. The rest of the time 
was waiting for that to happen." Q. During this time you were 
waiting, was anyone explaining to you what was taking place. A 
Not to my recollection. (See Cannon TR-580, 581. See also Rhodes 
TR-721.) Where Rhodes testified, nothing was said about mortgages 
with Capitol Thrift and Loan; nothing was said about the mortgage 
to Capitol Thrift and Loan in the amount of $32,325.00; nothing 
was said about Exhibit "32" (TR-737-739). Rhodes testified that 
there was a substantial deviation from the Earnest Money Receipt 
to the final papers; that he never understood it, nor did Pagan 
(TR-737-739). 
II. THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
Respondent's complain that the Court erred in giving 
Instruction No. 21. The objectionable parts of this instruction 
were offered and submitted to the Court by the respondents; in 
their proposed instruction No. 11 and 12, which are annexed 
hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
(This instruction did not in any way apply to the 
Respondent. A casual glance at the instruction reveals that this 
instruction applied only to the defendant, Alpha Leasing, who is 
not a party to this appeal. In fact, the jury in their special 
Verdict No. 6, found that Joseph Cannon was not an agent of Alpha 
Leasing and in Special Verdict No. 10, exonerated Alpha Leasing. 
Therefore, Instruction No. 21 has no application to this appeal.) 
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The legal effect of Instruction 21; is set forth verbatum in 
Respondents requested Instruction No. 21 (TR-310). See also, 
respondents requested instruction No. 11 (TR-310); Respondents 
are estopped from objecting to their own proposed instructions. 
The Courts attention is also called to respondents requested 
Instructions No. 7; 8; 9; 11; 12; 13 (TR-303-311); all of which 
were given in substance by the Court. This Court has repeatedly 
held that you cannot request that the Court give an instruction 
and later complain when your instruction is given. This is 
exactly what respondents are doing in this case. Capitol Thrift's 
proposed instruction No. 12 (TR-310) which is annexed hereto as 
an exhibit reads as follows: "You may in your discretion award 
such damages, if and only if, you find from a 'preponderance1 of 
the evidence that said defendant's acts were wilful and 
malicious." Also see Capitol Thrift's proposed Instruction No. 11 
(TR-309) which was given by the Court which reads as follows: 
"before punitive damages may be awarded, you must find the issues 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the individual defendants, 
and further you must find by a 'preponderance' of the evidence 
that the individual defendant's conduct in injuring the plaintiff 
was wilful and malicious." The instructions complained of were 
prepared and submitted to the Court by respondents herein. They 
should not be allowed to object when their proposed instructions 
were given in substance by the Court. See, Shupe v. Menlove, 18 
Utah 2d 130; Cordner v. dinger's, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 85. 
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With regard to Instruction No. 26, appellant represents to 
the Court that Instruction No. 26 is proper in all respects. This 
instruction is clearly set forth on page 185, of- the Jury 
Instruction Forms for the State of Utah; and has been given by 
the Utah Courts, as a proper instruction for the past twenty 
years. See Mecham v. Foley, 120 Utah 416, 235 P.2d 497 and Evans 
v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah). 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 
1983) does not apply to the instant case in fact or in law and 
has no bearing thereon. Appellants assert and allege that the 
instructions by the Court were proper in all respect. The Court's 
attention is called to the fact that in each instance, the Court 
in its special verdict with regard to Joseph Cannon, Capitol 
Thrift and Loan; and, Stewart Title Company respectfully 
requested that the jury make findings with regard to clear and 
convincing evidence. In each instance, the jury found by clear 
and convincing evidence that Joseph Cannon, Capitol Thrift and 
Stewart Title Company of Utah, did, by clear and convincing 
evidence, engage in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff. 
It was only after the special verdict was made and entered 
that the Court issued a judgment based on the jury verdict. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The jury heard the evidence, carefully examined all 
documents; the jury was properly instructed, and, answered 18 
questions and made 18 findings in appellant's favor and against 
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the respondents; the verdict was a result of a two-day 
deliberation; their findings and their award of damages are 
correct. The court's judgment based on the jury verdict should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of May, 1988. 
MARK S. MINE 
Attorney for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to 
Respondents' Attorneys, Kay M. Lewis and Bruce H. Shapiro, JENSEN 
& LEWIS, P.C., 320 South 300 East, Suite 1, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this 27th day of May, 1988. 
/srOS?^ 
Attorney for the Appellant 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone 363-1449 
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ADDENDUM 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. // 
In addition to the actual damages plaintiff alleges 
he has sustained, he also seeks to recover punitive or exemplary 
damages against the defendants. If you find the issues in favor 
of the plaintiff and that he is entitled to recover actual 
damages, you may also consider whether the plaintiff is entitled 
to such punitive damages. 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, you must 
find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
individual defendants, and further you must find from 
Xderanc^) of the evidence that the individual defendants1 conduct 
in injuring the Plaintiff was wilfull and malicious* If you so 
find, you may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as 
in your judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punishment 
to that defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to 
others not to offend in like manner. If such punitive damages 
are given, you should award them with caution and you should keep 
in mind that they are only for the purpose just mentioned and 
are not the measure of actual damage. Such damages must not exce 
ths cum of £5 00,000.00 the amount prayed for by the plaintiff. 
Capitol Thrift's 
Jury Instruction 
(TR-309) Given 
Proposed 
No. 11 
in 
Substance. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. / jyU 
If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a proxi-
mate result of the conduct of any of the defendants on which 
you base a finding of liability, you may then consider whether 
you should award punitive or exemplary damages against such 
defendant for the sake of example and by way of punishment. 
You may in your discretion award such damagesf if, but only 
if, you find by alpreponderance)of the evidence that said 
defendant's acts were wilful or malicious in the conduct on 
which you base your finding of liability. 
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you 
are to consider the following: 
1. The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defen-
dant. 
2. The amount of punitive damages which will have a 
deterrent effect on the defendant. 
3. That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable 
relation to the actual damages. 
Capitol Thrift1s Proposed 
Jury Instruction No. 12 
(TR-310). Given by thT~ 
Court. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you find that Plaintiff suffered damage as a proximate 
result of the conduct of any of the Defendants on which you base a 
finding of liability, you may then consider whether you should 
award punitive damages against such Defendant for the sake of 
example and by way of punishment. You may in your discretion 
award such damages, if,
 b u t only if, y o u find by a ( ^ ^ ^ ^ 
of the evidence that said Defendants' acts were willful or mall^ 
cious in the conduct on which you base your finding of liability. 
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you are to 
consider the following: 
1. The reprehensibility of the conduct of the 
Defendants. 
2. The amount of punitive damages which will have a 
deterrent effect on the Defendants. 
3. That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable 
relation to the actual damages. 
EXHIBIT "C" 
Proposed Jury Instruction 
by Joseph Cannon (TR-252) 
Under the law, it does not necessarily follow from a 
finding that one member of a partnership is liable for punitive 
damages that any or all of other members of the partnership aie 
also liable for punitive damages, • The acts or omissions of c>, * 
partner will justify an award of punitive damages against 
another partner or partners if and only if those acts or 
omissions are within the ordinary course and scope of part-
nership business and the other partner or partners against 
punitive damages are awarded authroized, participated in, or 
ratified those acts or omissions. 
If you find that the acts or omissions of Joseph N. Cannoi 
justify an award of punitive damages against him, punitive 
damages may be awarded agains the other partnersjof Alpha Leas 
ing if, and only if, you find by the preponderance^ojz the 
evidence each of the following elements: 
!• That at the time of the events at which this 
lawsuit occurred Joseph N. Cannon was acting as a 
partner of Alpha Leasing Company; 
2. That the acts of Joseph N. Cannon were within the 
ordinary course and scope of Alpha Leasing1s business 
3. That each of the partners against whom punitive 
damages are awarded sought, authorized, participated 
in, or ratified the acts or omissions of Joseph 
N. Cannon. 
INSTRUCTION NO - , -y 
In i l" I 
i i •! i t r r *i M i a a c t u a l damages p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s 
]te has s u s i i c i n e d , ITJ ;I > a J s i ^ K j i i > , i 'Mr uun ] i p " ' - "nu la ry 
damages a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t s . i t you f i n d t h e i s s a e s L.I 
favor J i. . J LJ ^ -1 •" " -1'" a ^ n c i t i e d ^ t r e c o v e r 
a c t u a l damages , you may a l b j c o n ^ . j , r w h e t h e r i n [ i i i i i 
"i s i : h p un i t i v e d am a c e • 
Be for a punitive damages • ><ar«.;ei ; *• find 
th:?, iss',ias in fiv'.jr of the plaintifi; and against the , , idual 
defendants, JJ 1 >* i L '• Iv-? , " •. ,:i"l ?TTF ^"^preponderance or* 
the evidence that the individual defendants' conduct in in"jm 
ue J 1 i i Ff; N i </1.1 If u 11 and na I, Icious . If you so £ ind » 
you may award, i£ you deen, it prope " ! i •< > • 
","•" v?ur ludgmen' would be reasonable and proper as a yunish-
III HI i J Uiui ae i;Hmid111 i u IM i n in in and as a wholesome 
(irnlna to others not t : offend in like manner. ' 
P'lhi .J, .Jjiniii.^f i i "• -f^ ver you should award Niem • ' ' 
caution and you siiouiJ Ke-- u in HM.II i i i im JI -» i i u che 
purpose lust mentioned JniiJ axe not the measure of actual damage. 
Sjch damage» i*
 t., j?\:-,jii 1^-e amount prayed for cv L..-: 
plaintiff. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. f* ? 
If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a pro.- « 
mate result of the conduct of any of the defendants on which 
you base a finding of liability, you may then consider whe-cher 
you should award punitive or exemplary damages againsz such 
defendant for the sake of example and by way of punishmer.-. 
You may in your discretion award such damages, if, hue enly 
if, you find Joy a prependerance^of the evidence that said 
defendant's acts were wilful or malicious in the conduce en 
which ycu base your finding of liability* 
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you 
are to consider the following: 
1. The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defen-
dant* 
2* The amount of punitive damages which will have a 
deterrent effect on the defendant* 
3* That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable 
relation to the actual damages. 
